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An Automatic Analysis Approach Toward Indistinguishability of
Sampling on the LWE Problem
Shuaishuai Zhu, Yiliang Han , and Xiaoyuan Yang
Abstract: Learning With Errors (LWE) is one of the Non-Polynomial (NP)-hard problems applied in cryptographic
primitives against quantum attacks. However, the security and efficiency of schemes based on LWE are closely
affected by the error sampling algorithms. The existing pseudo-random sampling methods potentially have security
leaks that can fundamentally influence the security levels of previous cryptographic primitives. Given that these
primitives are proved semantically secure, directly deducing the influences caused by leaks of sampling algorithms
may be difficult. Thus, we attempt to use the attack model based on automatic learning system to identify and
evaluate the practical security level of a cryptographic primitive that is semantically proved secure in indistinguishable
security models. In this paper, we first analyzed the existing major sampling algorithms in terms of their security and
efficiency. Then, concentrating on the Indistinguishability under Chosen-Plaintext Attack (IND-CPA) security model,
we realized the new attack model based on the automatic learning system. The experimental data demonstrates
that the sampling algorithms perform a key role in LWE-based schemes with significant disturbance of the attack
advantages, which may potentially compromise security considerably. Moreover, our attack model is achievable with
acceptable time and memory costs.
Key words: lattice-based cryptography; learning with errors; security model; Non-Polynomial (NP)-hard problems
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Background

With breakthroughs in modern computing power,
especially the development of quantum computers,
cryptography built on conventional hard problems, such
as reduction of large numbers and discrete logistic
problem, is potentially challenged in terms of security
strength. Many hard problems in number theory are no
longer complex enough in primitive design facing the
quantum algorithms. Thus, post-quantum cryptography
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is already an emerging field[1, 2] .
In Post-Quantum Cryptographic (PQC) primitives, the
Non-Polynomial (NP)-hard problems in lattice theory
are applied in many schemes to construct basic trapdoor
functions[3–8] , and traditional analysis methodologies
have been deployed to qualitatively evaluate PQC
schemes, such as side-channel attack[9] , flow analysis[10] ,
and message leakage attack[11] . Among all the lattice
hard problems, Learning With Errors (LWE) is the most
widely and easily applied in the design of Public-Key
Encryption (PKE), Identity-Based Encryption (IBE), and
Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) protocols. In
Refs. [5, 12], LWE is proved to be an NP-complete
problem, thus making LWE-based schemes semantically
secure against quantum attack models. Another lattice
hard problem applied in cryptographic schemes is the
Small Integer Solution (SIS), which is a dual problem
of LWE. In this paper, we focus on the sampling
problem of LWE, including the generation of error vector
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controlled by a fixed trapdoor. Without any exception, a
necessary component is vector sampling in lattice space.
Previous works show that the properties of sampling
algorithms have major influences on time complexity,
storage complexity, and overall security.
A sampling algorithm in LWE satisfies the following
three basic characters:
Indistinguishability. In an LWE sampling algorithm
with the same initial parameters, two instances I1
and I2 with respective outcomes e1 and e2 exist,
thus making it difficult to decide which outcome is
from I1 . This character can ensure the dependency
of each sampling. In the realization of ciphers,
indistinguishability indicates the hardness of deciding
whether the error vector comes from instances with or
without trapdoors[5] .
Availability. The availability indicates that a chosen
error vector is a random point that is accurate enough to
fit the point on the curve of probability density function.
Efficiency. The sampling process should be efficient
enough to synchronize the execution of cipher
algorithms. A main system bottleneck of the previous
LWE schemes is its low efficiency in sampling vectors
in lattice space.
The security of an LWE primitive depends on the
hardness of decoding the LWE problem masked with
error factors. In the realization of the details, the security
basis is largely rooted in the indistinguishability and
availability of sampling from lattice space. However,
in the evaluation routines of semantic security for
the existing LWE schemes, the security consideration
of sampling components is usually avoided by ideal
sampling assumption. In the era of artificial intelligence,
the sampling results may be easily identified and cracked
without following the above basic properties.
The basic steps of sampling in lattice is defined
by an ideal distribution on lattice, such as discrete
Gaussian, from which random points are chosen to
fit the required distribution. Unfortunately, only a
few systematically methods comply with the above
properties[13–17] . Rejection sampling[15, 18] is a primitive
way of sampling points on a given curve by applying
partitioning and testing. Peikert[17] presented inversion
sampling and parallel sampling mode to improve
sampling efficiency. In Refs. [16, 19], a dichotomy
algorithm that combines rejection and inversion of
samples is designed. In Ref. [13], Buchmann et al.
proposed a discrete ziggurat algorithm that aimed to
achieve time-memory maximum optimization. Roy et
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al.[20] designed an Field Programmable Gate Array
(FPGA) circuit model based on the Knuth-Yao algorithm,
which is an efficient stream generator of random
bits. However, its memory consumption is worse than
that of the ziggurat algorithm.
In this paper, we analyzed the previous dominant
sampling methods and proposed a novel framework
to evaluate the mentioned three properties. In the
framework, learning systems based on Support Vector
Machine (SVM), Logistic Regression (LR), and deep
learning models are designed and trained to decide
whether a sample is associated with a trapdoor.
The proposed framework can be applied in deciding
which sampling algorithm is better in handling the
indistinguishability of samples.
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows:
Necessary preliminaries are listed in Section 2. The
statistical attack model is constructed in Section 3
as our main contribution. Supplementary data are
demonstrated and analyzed in Section 4 to evaluate the
attack framework. We draw our conclusion in the last
section.

2
2.1

Preliminary
Notation

Let Z; R; and C denote the integer, real, and complex
number fields, respectively. We use the notation bi to
denote a vector or the i -th coordinate of b according to
our requirements. On differentq
norms of vectors, we note
X
X
jjvjj1 D
jvi j, jjvjj2 D
vi2 , and jjvjj1 D
i

i

max jvi j. For an integer lattice L, 2 .L/ denotes the 2norm of the shortest non-zero vector in L. DL; c denotes
a discrete Gaussian with a mean vector c. q; n denotes
a noise distribution bounded by a system modula q and
a security parameter n.
2.2

Definition

Definition 1. Let B D Œb1 jb2 j : : : jbn  be an nn matrix,
in which b1T ; b2T ; : : : ; bnT 2 Rn are linearly independent
vectors. Then, the n-dimensional lattice generated by B
is the following vector set:
˚
 D L.B/ D y 2 Rm ;
X
s.t. 9 s 2 Zm ; y D Bs D
si bi :
i D1

The rank of L.B/ is n, indicating that L.B/ contains
all linear combinations of b1T ; b2T ; : : : ; bnT .
Definition 2. A .Zq ; n; D/-LWE problem defined on
a discrete Gaussian distribution D over L is the access to
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a challenge oracle O, which is either a pseudo-random
oracle Op or a truly random oracle O t . Op and O t are
defined as follows:
Op generates a value .ui ; vi / D .ui ; uTi s C ei / 2
n
Zq  Zq , where s is a uniformly random vector in Zn ,
ui are randomly selected vectors in DL; s , and ei 2 Zq
are fresh noise samples in q; n .
O t generates a truly uniform random sample from
n
Zq  Zq .
Then, the decisional LWE problem is to distinguish
the source oracle of the outputs, and the computational
LWE problem is to recover s from .ui ; vi /.
Definition 3. An LWE-based PKE scheme consists of
four polynomial time algorithms: .D; /
init.n; q),
.A; TA /
keyGen.D; /, ci
Enc.A; mi ; D), and
mi
Dec.TA ; ci ).
A basic Indistinguishability under Chosen-Plaintext
Attack (IND-CPA) instance for one-bit message
encryption involves the following steps[5] :
p
(1) .s; B/
Keygen(n; q): Let  D n log2 n.1=
p
.q 2 //. Then, for s 2 Znq , A D fa1 ; a2 ; : : : ; an g
is chosen, in which ai 2 DL; s and ei 2  . Let
B D b1 ; b2 ; : : : ; bn , in which bi D
ei .
Xhai , si CX
(2) c
Enc(m; B): Let c D
ai ;
bi C
i 2S
i 2S

fhai ;bi ig
mbq=2c , in which S is a subset of 2
.
(3) m
Dec.c; s): For c D .c0 ; c1 /, if jhc1 ; si
bq=2cj > jhc1 ; sij, the algorithm outputs m D 0; else
m D 1.
Definition 4. An indistinguishability game is defined
by the following interactions between a challenger C and
an adversary A:
System initialization. C initiates a decryption oracle
with a set of public parameters PP D .n; q/ and sends
PP to A.
Phase 1. A issues N queries of the plaintext of fci g
that is adaptively chosen to decrypt. C answers the
queries with coordinate plaintext fmi g.
Challenge. A chooses two challenge messages
fm0 ; m1 g and sends them to C . C flips a coin and
randomly picks a number i 2 f0; 1g. Then, C encrypts
mi and sends the ciphertext back to A.
Phase 2. A repeats Phase 1 with the knowledge
acquired during previous phases.
Guess. A outputs a value j 2 f0; 1g, if j D i , A
wins the game.
In the above interactive game, an adaptively
Indistinguishability game under Chosen-Ciphertext
Attack (IND-CCA2) is defined. If Phase 2 is closed, then

the game is reduced to an IND-CCA game. When the
adversary can only access an encryption oracle in Phase
1, then the game reduces to an IND-CPA game. Each
type of game can semantically define a security model
for LWE-based public key cryptographic primitives.
Definition 5. For any polynomial time attacker A, the
.Z ; n; D/-LWE
cryptographic primitive based on LWE SA q
achieves semantical security in a .Zq ; n; D/-LWE
indistinguishable security model, if A wins the
indistinguishability game with negligible probability.
2.3

Assumption and corollary

Heuristic 1[21] . For an integer lattice, a constant c > 0
exists such that the ball of radius .2/ .L/ contains at
least 2n points of L. With coordinates renormalized,
these points are independently and uniformly distributed
in the unit ball.
Lemma 1[22, 23] . For any q D poly.n/ and m >
5n log q, n 2 ZC , a polynomial time algorithm
TrapGen.q; n/ exists, which can uniformly generate
a random matrix A 2 Znm
and a trapdoor matrix
q
TA 2 Zmm
satisfying
jjT
jj
6
O.n
log q/1=2 .
A
q
Lemma 2[22] . For any q > 2, a random matrix
A 2 Znn
, and a trapdoor matrix TA 2 Znn
of lattice
q
q
?
q .A/:
(1) A polynoimal time algorithm SampleGaussian
(A; TA ; ; c) exists, which returns an error vector e 2
?
q .A/ that closely satisfies the discrete Gaussian
distribution D;;c , in which  > jjTA jj!..log n/1=2 /
and c 2 Rn .
(2) A polynomial time algorithm SamplePre(A; TA ; u;
c) exists, which returns an error vector e 2 uq .A/ that
closely satisfies Duq .A/; and Ae D u mod q.
2.4

Discrete ziggurat sampling algorithm

The key idea of the ziggurat sampling algorithm is to
divide the x > 0 part of the area below the Gaussian
probability density function f .x/ into m rectangles with
the same area. Then, the coordinate x is sampled with
the following steps:
(1) The downright point (xi ; yi ) of each rectangle is
recorded, in which xm 1 < xm 2 <    < x0 and
ym 1 > ym 2 >    > y0 .
(2) The i -th rectangle is selected, in which i is a
random integer that satisfies 1 < i < m 1.
(3) A random number x 0 is generated within Œ0; xi . If
0
x 6 xiC1 , then x 0 is accepted, or else x 0 is rejected.
(4) y 0 2 Œyi 1 ; yi  is randomly generated. If y 0 C
yi 1 6 f .x 0 /, sampling from the Gaussian distribution
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is equivalent to choosing x 0 ; otherwise, Step 2 is
performed.
In the discrete field, the approach is identical except
with the addition of the following steps to round up to
the nearest integers:
(1) The area of each rectangle is defined as (1 C
xi)(yi yi 1 ), in which xi is rounded up to the nearest
integer.
(2) Let ym D x0 D 0 and xm D t  , in which t
and  are the upper bound and variance of the Gaussian
distribution, respectively. For all the m rectangles, we
set the same area S . Then, the coordinates are computed
with the following iterations:
ym 1 D S=.1 C xm/;
xm

1

Df

1

.ym

1 /:

For 1 < i < m 1,
yi D yi C1 C S=.1 C xi C1/;
xi D f

1

.yi /;

y0 D y1 C S=.1 C x1/:
(3) An ! 2 ZC is randomly selected, then y 0 is
uniformly sampled from f0; 1; : : : ; 2! 1g. Let yN D
hNi y 0 , in which hNi is the height of the i -th rectangle and
hNi D yNi 1 yNi . Finally, the algorithm outputs yN as a
sample.
2.5

Other sampling algorithms

Central limitation method. Let k be a uniformly
distributed variable: k  U.0; 1/. Then the variable
X12
X D
U.k/ 6 approximately complies with a
kD1
standard normal distribution if enough k samples are
generated.
Box-Muller algorithm. Let U1 and U2 be uniformly
distributed variables from independent sample sources,
X and Y are generated as two independent variables
with a normal distribution:
p
XD
2 ln U1 cos.2 U2 /;
p
2 ln U1 sin.2 U2 /:
Y D
2.6

Automatic learning system

The commonly applied learning frameworks of
integer vector-type data are SVM[24, 25] , LR[26, 27] , and
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)[28–30] , along
with their variables. They have superior advantages
in extracting the pattern of characters by learning the
relationships of different norms of vectors. Given that
these automatic learning systems are applied as basic
tools in our attack model, their data processing details
are not discussed in this paper.

3
3.1

Statistical Attack
Inspiration

All the cryptographic primitives based on trapdoor
technology usually reduce their hardness to hard
problems to achieve a semantic security level in welldefined security models. To the best of our knowledge,
some PKE schemes[3, 4, 7, 22] based on LWE and RingLWE (RLWE) are proved to be CPA secure in the
standard security model, and recently, IBE schemes of
CCA secure level[4, 7] (and Hierarchical-IBE (HIBE)[22] )
appeared in the selective Identity (ID) security model.
In the above schemes, the proof of indistinguishability
is based on the assumption of ideal sampling. In
this section, we take a close look at the process of
sampling and analyze the potential influence of sampling
algorithms on the semantic reduction in the security
proof. Given that the methodology is identical for all
the indistinguishability game of LWE, we focus on the
IND-CPA security model only, which is a basic and
weak security model. If Public Key Cryptography (PKC)
schemes under IND-CPA model with the problem of
restricted power is proven to be not secure, then the
attack results will hold in other strong secure models.
3.2

Attack

In this section, we first initiate an instance of
indistinguishability game over LWE-based PKE
mentioned in Definition 3 of Section 2.
System initialization. C fixes an encryption oracle
with a set of public parameters PP
.A D fa0 ; a1 ;
nn
: : : ; an g 2 Zq ; B D fb0 ; b1 ; : : : ; bn g 2 Znn
; D
q
p
1= n.log n/2 ; q 2 ZŒn2 ;2n2  ; c D 0/, a trapdoor vector
p
s 2 Zn , and noise vector ei  N.c; = 2 /, and sends
PP to A.
Query phase. A issues N queries of the ciphertexts
m 2 f0; 1g that are
Xadaptively
X chosen to encrypt.
 C
computes c D
ai ;
bi C mbq=2c , in
i 2S

i 2S

which S is a subset of 2A;B . For any chosen  > 0,
jSj D .1 C /.1 C n/ log q. Finally, C answers the
queries with coordinate ciphertexts c. Simultaneously,
A constructs and updates two databases O0 and O1 , in
which .m D 0; cm / 2 O0 and .m D 1; c1 / 2 O1 . The
quantity complexity of O0 and O1 is bounded by the
attack power of A or by the time of guess phase issued
by A.
Then, A simulates a guess oracle OO0 ;O1 supervised
by O0 and O1 with the following steps:
(1) All the samples from O0 and O1 are divided into
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b batches with 1 6 b 6 jO0 j C jO1 j.
(2) A polynomial time complex distinguisher M D
IND.O0 ; O1 ; ; b; PP / is run, which is a plugin
supervised learning system optimized to distinguish
matches of fm0 ; ci g and fm1 ; ci g in O0 [O1 . The global
optimizer of M is J. / D arg maxb!1 ffmi ; cj ji D
j gg.
(3) Steps 1 and 2 are repeated until b ! 1. The
learned oracle is expressed by the final state of  .
A simulates k guesses toward OO0 ;O1 with fmi ; ci g 2
O0 [ O1 , in which i 2 f0; 1g. For an accuracy , the
following two hypotheses are made by A:
H0. The oracle guess is accepted with the confidence
of .
H1. The oracle guess is rejected with the confidence
of .
Then, the oracle is checked to see whether
POO0 ;O1 fH0g >  holds in the simulation. If H1 holds
with k requests toward the oracle, A goes on to make
more queries to update O0 and O1 .
Challenge. A chooses two challenge messages m0
and m1 , and sends them to C . C flips a coin and randomly
picks a number i 2 f0; 1g. Then C encrypts mi and sends
the ciphertext ci back to A.
Guess. A outputs a value j 2 f0; 1g, if j D i , A
wins the game.
The advantage for A to win the game is computed as
AdvIND-CPA
D P fH0jM.k ! 1/g 1=2:
A
3.3

Evaluation

On guess of c  in fcm0 ; cm1 g, the adversary A has
two options. In Option I, a pure statistical method
is implemented with distribution parameter evaluation
over sampled data. Then the challenged ciphertext is
checked through a comparison of the confidence over the
evaluated parameters. In Option II, a fussy discriminator
based on learning system is designed to directly output
the result. According to learning theory, Option I is the
theoretical support for Option II, which indicates that
if Option I is not available, then the output of Option
II is not a significant one. We will prove the learning
availability in the view of Option I as our theoretical
support of the above attack framework.
For a sample set X D .c1 ; c2 ; : : : ; cn / in which xi D
Ami C ei , let XN be the mean variable of the sample sets
of O0 and O1 , then XN D nAm C .e1 C e2 C    C en / 
2
N.nAm;
N n /. For any mi , i 2 f0; 1g, we have
1
XN i D Ami C .e1 C e2 C    C en /
n

and then statistically,
2


XN 1  N.Am1 ; /;
n


N
Xi
ei
eO  2
DAC
N AC
;
:
mi
mi
mi n
˝
Next, we only need to evaluate the parameters A C
eO  2 ˛
;
by constructing and analyzing the two sample
mi n
databases built during the query phases of the CPA game.
Under the assumption of Heuristic 1, the probability of
successfully distinguishing O0 and O1 is negligible, but
with the involvement of the realized sampling algorithms
with a fixed routine, such as ziggurat sampling algorithm,
the noise samples potentially show uncontrolled patterns
compared with the ideal Gaussian distributions. From
the view of detailed sampling algorithm, we can draw
the following series of conclusions to identify pseudorandom samples from true random samples.
Theorem 1. On the sample sets O0 and O1 , < A C
eO  2
;
> satisfies non-bias evaluation and standard error
mi n
consistency.
Proof. Considering the process of sampling from
vertex coordinates and true random sources, we compute
eO
the limitation of A C
following the heuristic of
mi
discrete Gaussian
distribution:


 
eO
eO
lim E AC
D lim E.A/C lim E
D
mi
mi
jOi j!1
jOi j!1
jOi j!1
.1 C n=2/jOi j1=n
1
C
E.e/:
O
p
mi
So that for any positive
, we have ˇ

ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
eO
ˇ
ˇ
E.A/ˇ <  D
lim P ˇA C
mi
jOi j!1
  

eO
lim P E
< D
mi
jOi j!1
  

eO
P E
<  D 1:
mi


eO
Also, let D D S A C
be the mean standard
mi
error. Then a positive  0 that holds the following
requirement exists:
ˇ
ˇ

ˇ
 2 ˇˇ
0
ˇ
lim P ˇD
<  D 1:
nˇ
jO j!1
i

Then, according to
theory, there
 statistical evaluation

eO  2
exists parameters A C
;
, thus making the
mi n
partial sample sets O0 and O1 statistically consistent
with the LWE vector space. Then, we explain what kind
of sample sets are learnable by the following theorem:
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Theorem 2. The sample sets O0 and O1 are learnable,
if a traceable pattern expressed by  exists, which covers
the outputs in the sampling algorithms.
Proof. We assume the vector set B D fb0 ; b1 ; : : : ;
bn gN
nD0 and ei sampled from discrete Gaussian
distribution contain energy, as demonstrated by jjvjj2
for each v. Without losing any generality in any learning
system, we consider the neural network structure, in
which  is the weight of neural connections. If bi 2
O0 [ O1 , then the energy input by B is computed as
E.B; h/ D .aT  B C b T  h C B    h/;
in which .a; b; h/ 2 f0; 1gn are the state parameters
of the neural network. Then, we construct the joined
probability distribution function:
1
P .B; h/ D Q
e E.B; h/ ;
P
Q D B; h e E.B; h/ :
According to Theorem 1, a complete evaluation of
i 2 f0; 1g can be obtained from O0 and O1 . Therefore,
we can evaluate iO in the following conventional statistical
learning model:
.B; i/

P .hj.B; i /;  /

!

h

P ..B; i /jh;  /

!

iO ;

in which P .hj.B; i /;  / and P .ijh;  / are computed as
follows:
T
P .hj.B; i /;  / D Q1B  eb hCBwh ;
QB D P .B/  Q;
T
P ..B; i/jh;  / D Q1h  ea BCBwh ;
Qh D P .h/  Q:
Then, we can construct an optimization function with
the cross-entropy model:
8
9
N
<X
=
O D max
arg maxfJ./g
log P .bj / D
:
;
j D1
80
1
N
< X
X
max @
log
e E.bj ;h/ A
:
j D1
9
=
X
N log
e E.B; h/ ;
;
B; h

which can be optimized by solving the partial dispersal
differential equations on each batch of input according
to the analysis in Ref. [5]. For k D .jO0 j C jO1 j/=N
chosen in the learning phase, an optimized accuracy
O / exists, in which the guess oracle
k D P .B; ijh;
O
outputs i as the learning result.
Theorem 3. On the sample sets O0 and O1 from
sampling algorithm SA, which outputs s.0/ D Ami C
e.0/ and s.1/ D Ami C e.1/ , a decision model M exists

to decide the value of i with non-negligible probability
of accuracy, if OO0 ;O1 outputs iO with the distinguishable
accuracy of non-negligible probability of accuracy.
Proof. If OO0 ;O1 outputs iO with distinguishable
accuracy of non-negligible probability , then A can gain
the -advantage over .O0 ; O1 / from the learning phase
by launching k rounds of challenge simulation with the
oracle. In the challenge phase, A outputs a guess with
the output of OO0 ;O1 . According to the completeness of
jO0 j and jO1 j, if  is significantly non-negligible, then
in the one-time real challenge with C , the advantage of
A is
AdvIND-CPA
D P fH0jM.k D .jO0 j C jO1 j/=N /g
A
1
P .H0 ; k D .jO0 j C jO1 j/=N /
D
2

1
k
1
D .J. //
;
2
N 2
in which  indicates the optimized mapping of the
parameter k . If k is non-negligible, then the above
advantage is non-negligible.

4

Data

In this section, we instantiate the IND-CPA game defined
in Section 3 to test the availability and performance of
the attack framework between C and A.
4.1

Configuration

To fully evaluate the performance of our distinguishing
model, we realize an instance of the IND-CPA game, in
which the adversary A launches attacks by constructing a
guess oracle with a learning system. We design a series
of comparative tests to demonstrate the effectiveness
of the attack approach, including the frameworks
of accuracy, computing costs, and the parameter
optimization. Our computing platform includes: (1) the
adversary: ThinkCentre with Intel Core i5@2.7 GHz,
4 GB DDR4 RAM and 1 Gbit/s, 1 TB storage, and
1 Gbit/s ethernet; (2) the challenger: Lenovo X230 with
Intel Core i5@2.4 GHz, 4 GB DDR4 RAM, and 1 Gbit/s
ethernet.
Algorithms are coded based on Keras running on
Anaconda 3.7 (64 bit) with initial parameters listed in
Table 1. Uniformly random vectors are sampled with
fplll library.
4.2

Result

Given that the automatic cryptographic analysis based
on learning theory is still a new research field, no
comparable results in indistinguishable security attacks
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Table 1
Parameter
n
q
N
jO0 j
jO1 j
a
b
jhj
w

Initial parameter list.
Initial value
[60, 80]
2n2
Œ80; p
q n (2 ZC )
Œ1; 2p2n log n (2 ZC )
Œ1; 2 2n log n (2 ZC )
1
1
1024
[0,1](2 RC )

to the state-of-the-art are available. Thus, we compare
the accuracy only with the coordinate theoretical results
that appeared in the security proofs of some recent
works (CPA[5, 6] , CCA[8] ). The only difference is that the
sampling algorithms are ideal in previous schemes, while
in our attack, the sampling algorithm is based on the area
partition of probability density function or varieties of
pseudo-random generators.
On the basis of the combination of learning system
and sampling algorithms, we constructed nine types of
attack models, in which we evaluated the performance
with a group of fixed parameters of the PKC encryption
scheme[5] , which is a well-known initiative design based
on LWE.
Accuracy. To determine the effectiveness and
availability consideration of learning on the sample type
of float vectors, we pick the three most appropriate
learning systems to identify and extract the characters
of samples. We test the advantage of the oracles that
are constructed by the learning systems of SVM, CNN,
and LR. In each attack game, we apply all the three
sampling algorithms mentioned in Section 2. The main
purpose here is to test the effectiveness of the three
carefully chosen learning systems working on the PKC
scheme. The results are demonstrated in Table 2, from
which we can safely conclude the advantage for A to
win in different instances of each IND game. For all
the learning systems, the oracles that are built on CNN
inclines show more significant results.
Then, we focus on the instance built with CNN
oracles, whose performance is shown in Table 3. With
a fixed maximum size of O0 , O1 , and n, ziggurat
offers the best pseudo-random guarantee for the LWE
sampling. Central Limit Theorem (CLT) based algorithm
exhibits the most significant characters in the attack
game. We believe that the main reason is that under
the current sample scale, the output of CLT is less

Table 2
Model of oracle
Semantic advantage
SVM
CNN
LR

Results in accuracy test.
k
NULL
1
80
80

N (105 )
2q 1 n
1.15
2:90
2:00

Best advantage
Negligible
0.122 91
0.260 93
0.093 78

Table 3 Results of the accuracy test in the CNN-based
oracle.
Model of oracle
k
n
Best advantage
Ideal pseudo-random NULL [60, 80]
Negligible
Ziggurat
80
60
0.140 76
CLT
80
60
0.260 93
Box-Muller
80
60
0.230 82

likely to be Gaussian types of samples, according to
the assumption of CLT. Also, the sample sets from CLT
contain less isolated points, which may be accumulated
as a significant character in CNN. The process of
Box-Muller sampling consists of three fitting curves
with uniformly distributed variables. As a result, more
features are extracted from the above process than in
ziggurat.
Computation costs. A major challenge in effectively
simulating the attack game is the time and resource
costs for the adversary. Theoretically, for a vector
space of n D 60, the total points may reach at least
det.LnD60 / D q 60 according to the Gaussian heuristic.
We assume the samples obtained for tests accurately
match the probability density function curve, so that
a standard sample set can be available in the learning
oracle according to Theorem 1. Even if the scale of
samples is small, the learning system will work, as
long as the model parameters stably demonstrate their
boundaries. We evaluate the time and memory costs
from the angles of sampling algorithms and learning
systems, respectively, as shown in Figs. 1–4.

Fig. 1

Time training cost of the three oracles.
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Fig. 2

Time training cost for the three sampling algorithms.

Fig. 3

Dynamic memory cost of the three oracles.

Fig. 4

Dynamic storage cost of the three oracles.

The performance of learning systems varies
significantly in achieving a stable state. Figure 1 shows
that SVM and LR converge much faster than CNN with
the same amount of ciphertext samples, while CNN
demonstrates the best converging stability. Despite the
natural character of learning systems, such as learning
on batch strategy and local optimization strategy, CNN
consumes more time and samples to reach the same
training level. However, better accuracy is achieved
when CNN is used to process more samples. Thus, a

higher advantage will be achieved when more powerful
resources are offered for the CNN-based learning oracle.
Compared with the variance of  coordinating with
sampling algorithms in Fig. 2, all the subjects show a
significant consistency in achieving optimized stable
boundaries. Only the Box-Muller sampling needs more
time and queries to reach the same optimization level.
As we expected, the dynamic memory cost of
the adversary caused by the learning oracles varies
significantly, as shown in Fig. 3, especially for the
CNN-based learning oracle. The main reason for this
situation is its small-batch learning strategy, which
guarantees an accumulation of abstracted characters
in high dimension. Also, the dynamic memory cost
increases sharply as more queries are added in the
oracle. The dynamic storage cost may be less important
in the attack, but its scale partially decides the time
efficiency of data processing for the adversary. From the
result in Fig. 4, the increase rate of the dynamic storage
cost is approximately linear to the query processing.
However, the CNN model contains a multiple-layer
matrix to express the characters of previous samples,
thus reserving more storage for the matrix, and dynamic
storage cost increases steadily as the matrix transforms
from a sparse one to a normal one in the learning
procedure.
Parameter tune. Assuming that each round of
the IND game is statistically independent, the final
advantage of a learning oracle is decided by several
factors, including sampling algorithms, learning systems,
and initial parameters. With fixed parameters of k
and n, we evaluated the influences of the first two
factors. In this part, we explore the optimized advantage
of the adversary by searching and tuning the space
of k and n. The optimized results are demonstrated
in Table 4. The best advantage in Table 4 basically
reflects the performance of each parameter combination
of learning oracle in the IND game. CLT sampling
evidently has the maximum advantage for the attacker,
followed by the Box-Muller algorithm. The sampling
algorithms partially leak a large amount of discriminative
information of the ciphertexts, which verifies the
assumption at the beginning of this paper. Also,
the results in Table 4 indicate that the performance
of different learning systems varies tremendously,
especially for the case of CNN, which shows an
advantage in processing large-scale samples. Given the
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Table 4

Performance of all models after tuning on k and n.
Average storage
Best
Model of oracle
(k; n)
cost (MB)
advantage
Ideal pseudo-random
NULL
N/A
Negligible
hSVM-ziggurati
(10 000, 60)
18.647
0.164 90
hSVM-CLTi
(10 000, 60)
18.692
0.21205
hSVM-Box-Mulleri (10 000, 60)
18.739
0.190 92
hCNN-ziggurati
(100, 80)
46.582
0.247 21
hCNN-CLTi
(100, 80)
46.590
0.300 93
hCNN-Box-Mulleri (100, 80)
46.587
0.260 16
hLR-ziggurati
(100 000, 60)
18.681
0.123 53
hLR-CLTi
(100 000, 60)
18.685
0.107 69
hLR-Box-Mulleri (100 000, 60)
18.704
0.133 90

models. Thus, our automatic analysis of LWE-based
cryptosystem is a useful and meaningful attempt in the
field.
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